Constitutional Court Decision No.135/PUU-XXII/2024 gives rise to a new nomenclature in theElectionnamely national elections (DPR, DPD, and President/Vice President) which will be held in 2029 and local elections (Governor/Deputy Governor, Regent/Deputy Regent, Mayor/Deputy Mayor, and Provincial DPRD, Regency/City DPRD) which will be held in 2 years-2.5 years after the inauguration of the DPR and President.

One of the implications that arises from the decision is about the term of office of the Provincial DPRD, Regency/City DPRD which will end in 2029. However, the timeline for holding local elections will only be held after 2 years-2.6 years after the inauguration of the House of Representatives or the President. This means that in this period of time there is a possibility of an additional term of office of the DPRD for 2 to 2.5 years.

This is where the constitutional debate lies. In Article 22 E paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, it is explicitly stated about the implementation of elections which are held periodically every five years. The election is intended to elect the DPR, DPD, President/Vice President, and DPRD. If legislative elections at the local level (DPRD) are held after 2 years-2 years and six months after the inauguration of the DPR and the President, then the nature of the occasional election every five years will be lost.

DPRD local government regime

The critical point of the Constitutional Court's decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 lies in the local elections that intersect with the term of office of the DPRD, which is also a rejection of the principle of periodicity (fixed term) in elections held every five years.

The transition period, which is part of the Constitutional Court's judges' considerations, is often used as a basis for normalizing the constitutional complexity resulting from this Constitutional Court decision. Ignoring the impact that arises from this decision will set a bad precedent in the state.

Although it needs to be underlined, the Constitutional Court's decision that divides the election model with national and local elections, is theoretically an ideal decision. With various underlying considerations, this election design strengthens the presidential system of government on the one hand, while strengthening the system of regional autonomy on the other.

At this point, the formulation of the 1945 Constitution as a result of the amendmentconstitutionregarding the election shows the incomplete and ambiguous face of the constitution. In particular, when placing the election of DPRD members in the (national) election chapter. In fact, on the other hand, the DPRD is referred to as part of the local government as mentioned in Article 18 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution. Ideally, the norms of the DPRD election are placed in the regulation regarding Regional Government in Chapter VI, Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution.

Unfortunately, the inaccuracy in the placement of the DPRD in a cluster with representative institutions at the vertical level has been going on for a long time, even long before the constitutional amendment was carried out. Such as through Law No. 16 of 1969 concerning the Composition of the Position of the MPR, DPR, and DPRD which continues to this day through Law No. 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD3 Law).

Factually, the regulation regarding the DPRD can be found in two laws at once, namely the MD3 Law and the Local Government Law. Especially regarding the Local Government Law, the placement of DPRD arrangements in the local government cluster can be seen since the reform era through Law No. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government.

Ideally, the DPRD regulation is enough to be placed in the Local Government Law by revoking the regulation from the MD3 Law. Because doctrinally, the DPRD does not have a correlation as well as part of the representative institution at the central level. This scheme will be linear with the Constitutional Court's decision that places the regional elections and DPRD elections in one cluster, namely in local level elections.

Constitutional amendment

The Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/2024 is actually part of a change in the content (not the text) of the constitution, as in the view of Henc van Marseven and Ger van der Tang in Written Constitutions A Computarized Comparative Study (1978; 286) which states that constitutional changes can be made through the adjudication process in judicial institutions (constitutional change by adjudication).

The model of non-formal amendments to the 1945 Constitution after the constitutional amendment, in Fajrul Falaakh's view in Growth and Model of the Constitution and Amendments to the 1945 Constitution by the President, the House of Representatives, and the Constitutional Court (2014; 95) is due to the lack of establishment of the post-amendment constitutional regime. He said that non-formal changes to the constitution were also carried out by legislative institutions, including efforts to influence each other (interplay) between institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary. The situation is common in countries whose constitutional reforms have not been carried out consistently.

Non-formal changes that often occur through this unusual pattern should ideally be confirmed in an effort to improve the constitution after the fourth amendment to the constitution by taking the path of formal amendments to the constitutional text. The Constitutional Court Decision No. 135 of 2024 can be a trigger to take the choice of formal amendments to the constitution.

Although, this option is not easy, considering the rigid nature of the 1945 Constitution, where the procedure for amending the constitution is not flexible. There are quantitative requirements that must be met, such as proposed changes submitted by at least 1/3 of the total MPR members, article changes must be attended by at least 2/3 of the total MPR members, and 50% plus 1 of the total MPR members who approve the amendment of the article in question.

This was confirmed on several important occasions. Such as the proposal to increase the authority of the MPR in forming the Principles of State Direction (PPHN) which is one of the options by adding norms in the constitution. Previously, the DPD RI also proposed the fifth amendment to the Constitution with the aim of strengthening the authority of the DPD. All of the amendment plans ran aground halfway through. Formal amendments to the constitution are in fact not easy to do.

The need for a formal constitutional amendment to strengthen the constitutional building has relevance, especially after the Constitutional Court's decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 which gave rise to the nomenclature of local elections. The issue of the constitutionality of DPRD positions and local elections to elect DPRD members must be responded seriously by stakeholders.

Recently, a number of political parties in parliament have rolled out the discourse on constitutional amendments on a limited basis. This idea is certainly interesting to discuss more seriously while ensuring that constitutional amendments are intended to improve a number of norms that cause confusion. Including, the content of norms that have been changed informally through legislative and judicial channels, including the practice of interplay between state institutions such as the executive and judiciary.

Ferdian Andi, Executive Director of the Center for Public Policy and Legal Studies (Puskapkum), Doctoral Program Student of the Graduate School of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta.

This article has been published in MEDIA INDONESIA with the title "Pemilu Lokal dan Amendemen Konstitusi Nonformal", Tuesday, August 5, 2025.